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RACIALLY POLARIZED VOTING AND ITS
EFFECTS ON THE FORMATION OF A
VIABLE LATINO-ASIAN PACIFIC
POLITICAL COALITION
by James S. Lai

Ph.D. Candidate
Department of Political Science
University of Southern California
Editor's Note: The following article is a case study of the 1994 California
Assembly District primary election. The author would like to thank Dr.
Michael B. Preston for his constructive comments. He would also like to
thank those at the 1996 Western Political Science Association Conference in
San Francisco for their helpful suggestions.
INTRODUCTION

In "Paths To Political Incorporation For Latinos and Asian Pacifies in
California," Steven P. Erie, Harold Brackman, and James Warren Ingram Ill
(Erie et al.) examined the potentials and barriers for political incorporation of
Latinos, African Americans, and Asian Pacifies in California. According to
their findings, they argue that a bi-racial political coalition between Latinos
and Asian Pacifies is likely based on the following factors: language and
immigration issues. They stated:
Regarding a possible Latino alliance with Asian Pacifies, there
appears to be a strong basis for collaboration on behalf of an
immigrant rights agenda and in opposition to resurgent Anglo
nativism. The two groups converge to the center on attitudes
about economic development and crime, facilitating coalition
building. However, the prospects for a durable alliance remain
problematic ... The most serious barrier to constructing a
Latino/Asian Pacific coalition may be political rather than socioeconomic. Because of diffuse and commingled Latino and Asian
Pacific residential patterns in the Los Angeles metropolitan area,
political rivalries are structurally built into ongoing reapportionment dynamics (Erie, Brackman, and Warren Ill, 1993, p. 4).
In short, what Erie et al. argue is that the prospects for a Latino-Asian Pacific
political coalition are high when they are centered on policy issues like immigration and language (e.g. English-only referendums). However, when a
Latino-Asian Pacific political coalition is centered on political issues such as
constructing political boundaries and elected representation, the chances
are less likely. In contrast to this theory, Leland T. Saito stated in "Asian
Americans and Latinos in San Gabriel Valley, California: lnterethnic Political
Cooperation and Redistricting: 1990-92," that a Latino-Asian redistricting
and reapportionment coalition in San Gabriel Valley was able to form. The
reason according to Saito was due primarily to the fact that the number of
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Asian Pacific registered voters was not significant enough to be a threat to a
Latino candidate. Thus, Latino coalition leaders were able to agree with the
Asian Pacific leaders' redistricting plan without endangering the reelection
chances of an incumbent Latino candidate. However, an analysis of the
1994 49th Assembly district primary election will illustrate factors limiting biracial coalition building. This election represented a political challenge to
the assumption underlying the 1990 redistricting agreement between the
Latinos and Asian Pacifies, which was that a political district could be
redrawn to reelect a Latino representative. The assumption in 1994 that
Diane Martinez could be reelected was threatened by the arrival of a strong
Asian Pacific candidate, Judy Chu, who possessed both a strong name
recognition and a previous track record in Monterey Park.
The places represented in the 1994 49th Assembly district were the following: Alhambra, Belvedere, East Los Angeles, Los Angeles, Monterey Park,
Rio Hondo, Rosemead, San Gabriel, South San Gabriel, and Temple City.
The constituencies in these cities have been both predominantly Democratic
and Latino. However, with the increased demographic growth and subsequent political incorporation of Asian Pacifies over the last three decades,
particularly in the cities of Monterey Park and Alhambra where they currently
represent a majority of the population, the potential for increased political
conflict between Latinos and Asian Pacifies is great. For example, in
Alhambra, Monterey Park, Rosemead, and San Gabriel Valley, the percentages of Asian Pacifies of the total population were 38.1%, 57 .5%, 34.3%,
and 32.4%, respectively (Ong and Azores, 1991, p. 14).
LITERATURE

REVIEW

Previous studies conducted to determine the effects of a candidate's race
on a minority group-'s voting preferences (e.g. racially polarized voting) have
focused traditionally on African American voters. There exists a modicum of
studies conducted on the voting behavior of other minority groups such as
Asian Pacific and Latino voters. The central issue in these studies centers
around the methodological approaches of measuring racially polarized voting.
Illustrating direct correlation between racial bloc voting and racial candidates
is problematic. The ecological fallacy represents one such problem. One
cannot assume that ethnic groups vote homogeneously along ethnic lines
without taking into consideration other important socio-economic status variables (e.g. education levels; political ideology). Compounding this problem
is the unavailability of census data at the election precinct level which will
allow one to incorporate such data. The U.S. Census bureau does not provide such information which correlates directly to election precinct return
information of key state and local elections. Thus, the absence of such
information and an exit poll make it very difficult to illustrate direct correlation. As will be illustrated, there exist two methods of addressing the ecological fallacy issue. One methodological model employed by some scholars
include symbolic racism and realistic group conflict which utilize survey methods to explain one racial group voters' attitude toward another racial groups'
candidate. A second method, which is non-survey oriented, has been to analyze ethnic and racial representation at the census tract level to correlate
with election precinct returns, and then argue with some degree of likelihood
that racial bloc voting occurred. This method has been critiqued by statisticians who attempt to predict racial bloc voting behavior with a high degree of
1998-99 National Asian Pacific American Political Almanac
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certainty and a low degree of error through ecological regression models. It
is important to note that such models also cannot illustrate direct correlation
but can incorporate other socio-economic variables mentioned previously into
their analysis provided the existence of an exit poll.
METHOD ONE: SYMBOLIC RACISM
REALISTIC GROUP CONFLICT

AND

There exists two competing theories: symbolic racism and realistic group
conflict, in which both attempt to explain the effects of a candidate's race on
both African American and Caucasian voter attitudes. Symbolic racism
attempts to explain the political roles of Caucasian voter's attitudes to
African American candidates. According to a proponent, it is a joint function
of anti-African American affect and traditional Protestant ethnic values
(Sears , p. 56). Therefore, it is important to note that many of the studies on
symbolic racism focus on Caucasian voter's perceptions of African American
candidates. Realistic group conflict studies, in contrast, focus on both
African American and Caucasian voters. This theory argues that the central
political motive is the protection of group privilege which can be measured by
determining the group members' perception of tangible out-group threat
(Bovasso , p. 5).
In attempting to measure the influences of a candidate's race on African
American and Caucasian voters' political motives from either a symbolic
racism or realistic group conflict perspective, many studies have relied on
various survey techniques such as self-administered questionnaires [David
Sears and R. Kinder (1970, 1971); T. F. Pettigrew (1971); J.B. Mcconahay
and J.C. Hough Jr. (1976), Moskowitz and Stroh (1994)], national survey
data [Lawrence Bobo (1985)] , and telephone surveys [Bovasso (1993)].
In the Sears and Kinder studies in 1970 and 1971, the authors introduced
the concept of symbolic racism by examining the findings of a survey during
the Los Angeles mayoral elections of 1969 which pitted an African American
candidate, Tom Bradley, against a Caucasian candidate, Sam Yorty. The survey was created by Thomas Pettigrew who also examined Caucasian voters'
responses to African American mayoral candidates. The questions that the
survey used to measure symbolic racism were divided into three categories:
1) Antagonisms towards African Americans' demands; 2) Resentment about
special favors for African Americans; and 3) Denial of continuing discrimination (Sears, p. 57). The findings of the questions in each category illustrated
anti-African American affect in terms of antagonism, resentment, and anger
towards African Americans' wishes and lack of sympathy for them (Ibid}.
In the Moskowitz and Stroh study, the authors support the symbolic racism
perspective. They employed a self-administered questionnaire distributed to
a non-probability sample of 424 Caucasian subjects by students in several
undergraduate political science courses at Georgia Southern University during Fall 1990 to Winter 1991. The authors manipulated the race of a hypothetical candidate to determine how the candidate's race influences voter
preference through stereotype biases along with other "affect-laden" impacts
of racial prejudice. The questionnaire was designed in two-sections. The
first section was used to determine respondent's feelings about a public policy issue. The second section contained three items designed to elicit and
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measure racist feelings about African Americans and asked them to respond
to a seven point scale (One-strongly agree; Seven-strongly disagree):
(1) Over the past few years the government and news media have
shown more respect to blacks than they deserve.
(2) Over the past few years, blacks have gotten more than they
deserve.
(3) Blacks are getting too demanding in their push for equal rights.
Once the respondents completed the questionnaire, they were then asked to
look at a campaign brochure of a fictitious candidate whose picture was
included as either an African American or Caucasian candidate. The authors
found "that the more racist an individual, the more likely the individual projects the opposite of his or her position onto blacks"(Moskowitz and Stroh ,
p. 325). In other words, the more racist a voter was , the lower his or her
evaluation of the African American candidate would be.
Lawrence Bobo, a proponent of realistic group conflict theory, also utilized a
survey technique in 1988 to determine that racial group conflict is realistic
when it involves a group oriented concern for the redistribution of power,
wealth, and status of conflicting groups. In particular, Bobo looked at
Caucasian voter opposition to busing and attitudes toward African American
political activism. In regard to the latter, Bobo found that Caucasian voters
perceived African American candidates and public policy as a threat to the
redistribution of power and wealth in what he termed as the "paradox of
racial attitudes. " The paradox lies in Bobo's 1988 national survey findings
which illustrated that Caucasians, in general, were beginning to become
more accepting of African American social and political equality over a long
period while at the same time were becoming less tolerant of public policies
intended to achieve these forms of equality.
Another survey technique utilized to measure the influences of a candidate's
race on African American voters' preferences is the telephone survey of a
random population sample . In the Bovasso study, an attempt was made to
determine whether "the perception of racial out-group threat and dissatisfaction with public resources predicted candidate support in registered
Democrats" (Bovasso, p. 6). Bovasso was interested in measuring both
African American and Caucasian voters' perceptions to determine their different motives of racial politics in the context of the symbolic racism and
realistic group conflict debate.
Bovasso took a random sample of 1,935 New York City voters in the 1988
Democratic New York City Mayoral race in which incumbent Edward Koch and
David Dinkins were the candidates, and then used a random digit dialing
technique to implement a questionnaire. The format of the questionnaire
was designed to determine whether African American and Caucasian voters'
would reelect Koch as oppossed to the other Republican and Democratic
challengers :
Some people say that Mayor Koch is doing a good job and
deserves to be reelected while others say that he should step
aside to make way for new leaders. What do you think: do you
support Mayor Koch or would you like to see someone else for
mayor?
1998-99 National Asian Pacific American Political Almanac
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Bovasso used responses to the aforementioned question to determine indirectly how Caucasian voters would vote for the African American candidate,
David Dinkins. The findings from the telephone survey supported both symbolic racism and realistic group conflict perspectives.
METHOD TWO: ADDRESSING THE ECOLOGICAL
FALLACY THROUGH NON-SURVEY METHODS

A second method employed by some scholars is to overlay census tract data
over election precincts to determine the likelihood of racially polarized voting.
One problem with this method is that all election precincts within a political
district do not always fit within a census tract, nor do all census tracts fit
exactly within a political district. However, such methods are not uncommon
and have traditionally been the standard. In Elmer R. Rusco's study, "Voting
Patterns of Racial Minorities in Nevada"; Grant Din's study, "An Analysis of
Asian Pacific American Registration and Voting Patterns in San Francisco";
and Henry Der's study, "Bilingual Ballot Foes Disagree on Statistics," all of
these authors employed this methodology to illustrate racially polarized voting among African American, Latino, and Asian Pacific American voters.
The above methodology has not been accepted without criticism. One such
criticism is that the above methodology assumes that ethnic and racial
groups vote homogeneously along ethnic and racial lines. Freedman et. al.
in their study, Ecological Regression and Voting Rights, have argued that by
violating this principle, this can lead to unreliable results. Others such as
Engstrom and McDonald in their study, "Quantitative Evidence in Vote
Dilution Litigation," argue that the correlation co-efficient does not adequately demonstrate the relationship between individual correlations and ecological correlations. Thus, the non-survey models of measuring racially-polarized
voting is at its infancy, and other innovative models have been developed by
others. In Wendy Tam's study, "Asians-A Monolithic Voting Bloc?," she
attempts to address the above difficulties by developing a specific aggregated multinomial model which treats socio-economic values of Asian Pacifies
as nonlinearly related as opposed to the traditional linear analysis.
Nevertheless, despite these models, none can claim direct correlation of
racially polarized voting among the respective minority groups they are analyzing. The issue therefore becomes tautological.
SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY

The 1994 49th Assembly district represented an ideal case study of the theory expounded by Erie et al. in accessing the potential for a Latino-Asian
Pacific American political coalition in a political district which contained cities
with large and commingled Latino and Asian Pacific communities. The candidates that will be focused on in this study are Diane Martinez and Judy Chu
who finished first and second, respectively, in the primary with Martinez
eventually winning the general election. As will be illustrated and argued
later in the Findings section, Erie et al. were correct in their analysis in two
key areas. First, commingled patterns of settlement in the cities in the
1994 49th Assembly district represented politically charged areas among
Latinos and Asian Pacific candidates, and thus a potential barrier existed for
a Latino-Asian Pacific political coalition. Second, a formidable obstacle in
160
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the formation of a viable Latino-Asian Pacific political coalition was the lack
of a solid registered voter base. As Browning, Marshall, and Tabb found in
their study on the successes and failures of minority mobilization in ten
cities, a politically effective political coalition cannot occur without a strong
voter base:
With only one or even with no minority representatives, a dominant coalition strongly committed to minority interests might still
be able to turn a city government around. Conversely, even substantial minority representation might have little or no effect
where minority groups fall short of 50 percent of the voting-age
population, as they usually do (Browning, Marshall, and Tabb,
1991, p. 9) .
This was more the case for the Asian Pacific constituency in the 1994 49th
Assembly district primary election in which their registered voting base was
not as large as it was for Latinos.
RESEARCH

QUESTIONS

The following research questions will be addressed in this study in relation
to the Erie et al. thesis regarding the formation of a viable Latino-Asian
Pacific political coalition in the 1994 49th Assembly district primary election.
Question One: To what extent were both Latinos and Asian Pacifies able to
racially mobilize their votes and campaign contributions in favor of their
respective candidates?
Question Two: To what extent was there racially polarized voting among the
Latino and Asian Pacific identified primary voters in the 1994 49th Assembly
district primary election?
A) If there was racially polarized voting, what were some of the political factors that attributed to it?
Question Three: What are the implications of racially polarized voting on the
formation of a viable Latino-Asian Pacific political coalition in a future Los
Angeles district?
SCOPE AND

METHODOLOGY OF STUDY

1. Election Precincts and Definition of Racially Polarized voting:
Addressing The Ecological Fallacy

In order to determine whether racially polarized voting occurred in the 1994
49th Assembly district primary election, every tenth election precinct was
randomly selected in all ten cities. This was done to ensure randomness
and to maintain internal validity within the entire political district. There were
three cities with less than ten election precincts: Rio Hondo, South San
Gabriel, and Temple City. Subsequently, they were not counted based on
the random selection criteria of every tenth election precinct. As a result of
this selection criteria, the cities and the total number of their election
precincts examined were the following: Alhambra (5), Monterey Park (4), Los
Angeles (2), Rosemead (2), San Gabriel (2), Belvedere (1), and East Los
1998-99 National Asian Pacific American Political Almanac

161

Angeles (1). It is important to note that there is no certain method to determine whether racially polarized voting actually did or did not occur among the
Latino and Asian Pacific voters, because there was no exit poll conducted by
either campaigns or local newspapers. Thus, one of the questions examined
in this study is whether theoretically racially polarized voting occurred among
both racial groups based upon the available precinct data.
The precinct data was obtained from the Los Angeles County Office of the
Registrar Recorder in Norwalk, and consisted of the following: official election precinct returns per candidate; election precinct rosters; and official
campaign contribution data. From the election precinct rosters, the surnames of precinct voters were divided into three categories: Latino, Asian
Pacific , and "Other. " The category "Other" represented all surnames identified as neither Latino nor Asian Pacific.
A combination of two thresholds was used to determine if racially polarized
voting theoretically occurred. One threshold used was the court's analysis
in Thornburg v. Gingles which found that racially polarized voting occurred if
any racial group voter (e.g. Latino voter) voted fifty percent or over for a candidate of the same racial group (e.g. Latino candidate) .1 The second threshold used was the Pearson correlation analysis (r) which determined the
strength of relationship between the total number of identified racial group
election precinct voters and the total number of precinct votes received by a
racial group candidate. Once the r is obtained, the correlation coefficient
(r 2 ) can also be determined. This correlation analysis could only be performed on Alhambra and Monterey Park because they contained more than
two randomly selected election precincts. It is not possible to run a pearson
analysis in cities with less than or equal to two election precincts.
In performing a pearson r analysis, the strength of relationship between the
amount of Latino and Asian Pacific identified precinct voters with the amount
of precinct votes received by Martinez and Chu can be determined .
However, because applicable census data at the election precinct level could
not be obtained , a regression analysis cannot be performed. Therefore ,
socio-economic status variables such as educational attainment, income,
and generation differences cannot be factored into the equation. Such factors are recognized as being significant because to assume that all ethnic
groups vote homogeneously is false. As a result, the strength of relationship
can be determined from the existing precinct data, but it is not possible to
determine whether this relationship is statistically significant.
2. Demographic and Political Characteristics of the 1994 49th Assembly
District

Table 1 shows the six cities that were completely within the boundaries of
the 1994 49th Assembly district. In five of these six cities, Asian Pacifies
and Latinos represented the two largest racial groups. These cities represent commingled residential patterns with Latinos and Asian Pacifies.
Table 2 shows that the Democratic Party represented a majority of the registered voters in the five largest cities. East Los Angeles represented the city
with the largest percentage (79 %) of registered Democratic Party voters.
This was 23 percentage points higher than the second highest percentage
(56%) in Monterey Park. A majority of East Los Angeles Democratic Party
registered voters were Latino. The significance of these percentages illus162
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Table 1 Latino and Asian Pacific Populations Within Selected Cities 2 Source:

Hispanic
Cities
Population
Alhambra
29,260
Monterey Park
18,465
Rosemead
25,463
San Gabriel
13,297
119,418
East Los AnQeles
Temple City
5,771

Asian Pacific
Population
31,519
34,977
17,772
12,090
1,583
6,088

White (Not of
Hispanic Oriain)
20,106
7,185
8,282
11,379
3,254
18,962

Source: 1990 U.S. Bureau of Census

trated why the 49th Assembly district voters have historically been both
Democrat and Latino. Both of these characteristics are important to keep in
mind in understanding the barriers to the formation of a viable Latino-Asian
Pacific political coalition in the 1994 49th Assembly district primary election .

I.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE 1994
49TH ASSEMBLY DISTRICT PRIMARY
ELECTION

Table 2 Political Characteristics of Selected Cities in the 1994 49th
Assembly District
Total Number of
City
Re_qistered Voters
Alhambra
29 , 128
8 , 076
East Los Anaeles
Monterey Park
23,308
14,253
Rosemead
San Gabriel
13 , 330

Democratic Party
Re_qistered Voters
15,124
6,366
13 , 086
8,206
6,479

Percent of Total
Re_qistered Voters
53%
79%
56%
58%
49%

Source: Los Angeles County Office of the Registrar Recorder: Office of Campaign Information.

The 1994 49th Assembly district primary election represented an important
election in analyzing the potential for a bi-racial political coalition between
Latino and Asian Pacifies in cities where commingled residential patterns
existed. As mentioned earlier, the two main candidates running in the June
4th Democratic primary were incumbent Diane Martinez and former Monterey
Park mayor and current city councilwoman Judy Chu.
The sequence of events which led both Chu and Martinez to declare their
candidacies in the 1994 49th Assembly district primary election illustrated
the degree of political urgency that existed for both campaigns. Each campaign represented minority groups which attempted to achieve greater representation in what has historically been defined as a "Latino" district. In
October of 1994, Martinez, the incumbent representative of the 49th
Assembly district, announced that she was considering running for the state
Senate seat vacated by Art Torres who decided to pursue the state
Insurance Commissioner position. At the time of Martinez's announcement,
1998-99 National Asian Pacific American Political Almanac
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Chu put her name in as a candidate for the Assembly seat which apparently
angered Martinez because she had deferred the seat to Hilda L. Solis, another Latina (Holguin, 1994, B2). As a result of Chu's announcement, Martinez
decided to seek reelection in the 49th Assembly district. According to
Martinez, she believed that Chu should have deferred to her at that point:
"To me, its unfortunate that someone has as much ambition that they can't
wait their time" (Holguin, 1994, B2).
The Martinez and Chu campaigns attempted to downplay the inter-racial tensions among Latinos and Asian Pacifies in the 1994 49th Assembly district
primary election. According to Diane Martinez, in an interview with the Los
Angeles Times regarding the significance of race and ethnicity prior to the
primary: "It's not really something I concern myself with. The issues are not
about color" (Holguin, 1994, B2). Chu's response to the same question in
the article was also devoid of the race issue: "I'm presenting myself as a
candidate for all people" (Holguin, 1994, B3). Instead of focusing on the
issue of race as the major issue of the primary election, both candidates
focused on who was more qualified to achieve the common goals of improving education and the economy while reducing crime.
Table 3 shows the official election results, both Martinez and Chu accounted
for nearly 78 percent of the total votes. The significance of this being that it
was a two person election.
Table 4 shows the margin of votes between Martinez and Chu in the
Democratic primary was less in Alhambra, Monterey Park, Rosemead, and
San Gabriel than in East Los Angeles. The reason for this can be seen in
the fact that there existed large Latino and Asian Pacific communities within
these cities whereas in East Los Angeles, it was a predominantly a Latino
population. Therefore, it will be theoretically argued that racially polarized
voting occurred among the identified Latino and Asian Pacific precinct voters
in these cities.
According to an interview with Judy Chu, she acknowledged that race did play
a significant role in the Democratic primary: "People who don't know you personally except by a name or face, they're going to be voting based on race."
Chu also believed the Latino voters in East Los Angeles most likely voted for
Martinez because of her race: "She (Martinez) is a name that sounds familiar. The Latino voters in East Los Angeles, who did not know me or the
issues of my campaign, likely voted for Martinez because she was a Latino"
(phone interview by author, Los Angeles, 21 April 1996). In contrast, in a

Table 3 1994 49th Assembly District Primary Election
Results: Top Three Candidates

Candidate

Grand Total
Votes Casted

Grand Total
Votes Received

Percent of
Grand Total

11,545
7,646
3,179

46.86%
31.04%
12.09%

24,635
Diane Martinez
Judy Chu
Roy Torres

Source: Los Angeles County Office of the Registrar Recorder: Office of Campaign Information.
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Table 4 Total Votes Per Top Three Candidates
In the1994 49th Assembly District

Candidate

Citv
ALHAMBRA

Total Votes
Casted
4,561

Martinez
Chu
Torres
EAST L.A.

UNINCORPORATED

54.40%
7.39%
28.43%

1 , 622
1,569
483

40 . 75%
39.42%
12.14%

982
666
267

46. 70%
31.67%
12.70%

933
709
230

45. 70%
34. 72%
11 .26%

16
6
5

50%
18. 75%
15.63%

2,530
613
891

56. 79%
13.76%
20%

32

Martinez
Chu
Torres
Martinez
Chu
Torres

840
11 4
439

2,042

Martinez
Chu
Torres
TEMPLE CITY

47.40%
32.90%
11.93%

2,103

Martinez
Chu
Torres
SAN GABRIEL

2,162
1,501
544

3,980

Martinez
Chu
Torres
ROSEMEAD

Percent of
Total

1,544

Martinez
Chu
Torres
MONTEREY PARK

Total Votes
Received

4,455

Source: Los Angeles County Office of the Registrar Recorder: Office of Campaign Information.

recent interview with Susan Baker, Diane Martinez's campaign manager, she
believed that race did not play any significant factor in either Martinez's campaign strategy or the votes she received:
In my opinion, anything that was ethnic had nothing to do with
it...We have been raised in this country that if you are a citizen,
you are American. This is the way we ran the campaign. We
didn't target any one special interest group or one particular race
(phone interview by author, Los Angeles, 25 April 1996).
The significance of race in the 1994 49th Assembly district primary election
will be examined in the following section to determine whether or not racially
polarized voting occurred in these heavily Latino and Asian Pacific populated
cities. But before determining whether this occurred, the issue of whether
1998-99 National Asian Pacific American Political Almanac
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Martinez's or Chu's campaign attempted to reach out to other voters aside
from those of their own racial group must be addressed.
Both the Martinez and Chu campaigns attempted to appeal beyond their
respective racial group voters in the district. The Chu campaign attempted
to target a broad cross-racial base of voters in the 49th Assembly district.
According to Chu:
I definitely tried to target a broad range. I tried to canvass as
many voters as I could. In addition, we were walking neighborhoods and doing mailers. I went to a number of Latino forums
such as the City Terrace Forum and the Mother's of East Los
Angeles to outreach to the Latino voters (Chu, interview).
The same strategy was employed by the Martinez campaign. As Susan
Baker stated: "We looked at the precincts to find out where the largest number of voters were and we targeted them " (Baker, interview).
For the Martinez campaign, there existed several beneficial factors which
she could heavily rely upon that Chu could not. The first was that she was
the incumbent representative of the 49th Assembly district. This meant that
she not only understood which cities and racial groups would give her the
necessary votes but also there existed cities with large concentrations of
Latino voters . An example of a heavily populated Latino neighborhood is
unincorporated East Los Angeles, in which Latinos represented over ninety
percent of the total poll voters in three of the election precincts analyzed. It
would be safe to assume that a majority of those Latino voters would likely
vote for a Latino candidate whether it be Martinez or Torres. The significance of this is that it gave Martinez a large potential voting sector which
she could target. Secondly, like Chu, Martinez had a previous track record of
public service in the area. Chu was the former Monterey Park mayor and current city councilwoman, whereas Martinez was the incumbent representative
of the 49th Assembly district. However, unlike Chu, Martinez represented a
larger constituency which would potentially allow her to appeal to a larger
cross-section of voters.
Despite the large number of Asian Pacifies in Alhambra, Monterey Park,
Rosemead, and San Gabriel, Chu was unable to translate them into votes as
greatly as Martinez did with the Latinos in these cities.
As seen in Table 5 , Martinez captured a greater number of first place finishes in the election precincts of Alhambra , Monterey Park, San Gabriel, and
Rosemead than Chu, despite the fact that the Asian Pacific population is the
largest in each of these cities. For example, in Monterey Park, Martinez captured 23 first place precinct finishes (56% of the total) compared to Chu's
16 first place precinct finishes (39 %), despite the fact that Asian Pacifies
constituted 57 .5 percent of the total population. The same trend existed in
Alhambra where Asian Pacifies represented the largest group at 38.1 percent
of the total population. Martinez captured 43 first place election precinct finishes (84% of the total) compared to Chu 's 7 first place election precinct finishes (14% of the total) . With these general primary results in mind, there
existed three voting trends that were found to have occurred among the
Latino and Asian Pacific voters.
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Table 5 Election Precinct Finishes For Three Candidates
In 49th Assembly District Cities.
Candidate
Diane Martinez
Judy Chu
Rov Torres
Diane Martinez
Judy Chu
Roy Torres
Diane Martinez
Judy Chu
Rov Torres
Diane Martinez
Judy Chu
Rov Torres
Diane Martinez
Judv Chu
Roy Torres
Diane Martinez
Judv Chu
Roy Torres
Diane Martinez
Judv Chu
Roy Torres

Citv
ALHAMBRA
Total N=52

MONTEREY PARK
Total N=41

ROSEMEAD
Total N=22

SAN GABRIEL
Total N=23

EAST L.A.
Total N=12

TEMPLE CITY
Total N=1

UNINCORPORATED
Total N=28

1st Place
Precinct Finish

2nd Place
Precinct Finish

3rd Place
Precinct Finish

43 /2 ties)
7 (2ties)
0

7 (2 ties)
42(1 tie)
/1 tie)

0
0
51

23 /2 ties)
16 (2 ties)
0

16
22
1

0
1
40

19
3
0

3
19
0

0
0
22

18
5
0

5
18
0

0
0
23

12
0

0
1
11

0
11
1

1
0
0

0
1
0

0
0
1

27

1
12 (1 tie)
12 /1 tie)

0
15
15

0

Source: Los Angeles County Office of the Registrar Recorder: Office of Campaign Information.

II.

FINDINGS

AND

TRENDS

Trend One: Low Asian Pacific Election Precinct Voter Turnout and High
Campaign Contributions

The first trend found in the 1994 49th Assembly district primary election was
a combination of a low Asian Pacific election precinct voter turnout coupled
with a high amount of campaign contributions. In several Alhambra election
precincts, 0150005A and 01500006A, there were eight and four identified
Asian Pacific precinct voters out of 58 and 51 total identified voters for 15. 7
and 7 .8 percent of the total, respectively. These findings tend to support
previous studies of Latino and Asian Pacific racial mobilization trends in
other local and state-wide California elections. According to Byran Jackson's
study of the ethnic voter turnout in the 1982 and 1986 California
Gubernatorial elections, the Asian Pacific voter turnout rate in 1986 was 27
percentage points compared to 14 percentage points in 1982 (Jackson,
1991, p. 212). As Jackson stated, Asian Pacific voters represented the lowest turnout among Anglo, Latino, and African American voters. Thus, what
were the factors which contributed to the low Asian Pacific voter turnout in
the 1994 49th Assembly district primary election? There appear to be several factors responsible for their low voter turnout.
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The first factor was that many of the Asian Pacific registered voters were registered immediately before the primary election. There was an intense door
to door voter registration drive by the Chu campaign to get out the Asian
Pacific vote. According to one Chu volunteer,
We worked all day and morning to walk to every house in the identified Asian Pacific precincts. I would go to the houses in the
afternoon, and if they weren't there, they were probably at work.
I knew I had to come back either late in the evening or early in
the morning to register them at their homes (Sy, Levin G., phone
interview by author, Los Angeles, 7 April 1996).
Yet despite the Chu campaign's attempt to register as many Asian Pacifies
before the June 4th primary, many of these registered voters who did not
vote by absentee ballots, also did not vote at the precinct polls. As Michael
Eng, a Chu campaign strategist, stated:
Many of the Asian Pacific Americans registered by us will not vote
in the Democratic primary because of the fact they usually do not
vote in the election prior to the one they are registered before.
This is problematic among the Asian Pacific community. That's
why they must be registered throughout the entire year and not
just before an election (phone interview by author, Los Angeles,
21 April 1996).
Another interesting trend among the Asian Pacific voters was the high degree
of absentee ballots use which was similar to previous elections. In the special 1991 46th Assembly district primary election, there also existed a high
degree of absentee ballot use among Korean American voters (Lai, 1994, p.
36). In that election, the Korean American voters were targeted by the
Korean American candidate, T.S. Chung, through absentee ballots which in
turned allowed him to capture the largest number of absentee ballots among
all candidates. One of the reasons for their preference for absentee ballots,
according to Chung's campaign consultant was that "many Koreans work
from early in the morning to late at night, so they don't have the time to go
to the polling place" (Lai, 1994). This belief also applied to other Asian
Pacific ethnic groups as illustrated in the 1994 49th Assembly district primary election. Judy Chu received the most absentee votes among all three
Democratic candidates with 2,248 compared with Martinez's second most
absentee votes of 1,757.
A second factor contributing to the low Asian Pacifc voter turnout was the
large percentage of foreign born Asian Pacifies during the last twenty-five
years and the political resocialization that must occur for them to become
familiar with mainstream political culture and institutions within their newly
adopted homeland. Between the decades of 1970-80, the percentage of foreign born Asian Pacifies increased due to the increase in international migration. In 1980, 63.1 percent of all Los Angeles county Asian Pacifies were
foreign born; the percentages among the various ethnic groups were:
Vietnamese (92.9 %), Koreans (85.9 %), Filipinos (72.8%), and Chinese
(70.3%) (Nakanishi, 1985, p. 33). Their need for political resocialization is
what Lucian Pye believed to have stemmed from nativistic cultural views of
recent Asian immigrants in his study Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural
168

1998-99 National Asian Pacific American Political Almanac

Dimensions of Authority :

In all Asian societies, including Japan, there has been an ambivalence about the relationship between wealth and power. The general view was usually one in which wealth should not properly
lead to power ... when power was seen as properly associated with
status, the thrust of political behavior was always in the direction
of stability and order for the total system as well as dignity for the
individuals at every station in society (Pye, 1984, p. 49).
Another explanation for low voter turnout is the tendency for recent Asian
Pacific immigrants to focus on homeland politics as opposed to American
politics (Nakanishi, 1985, p. 47). However, as Nakanishi and others have
argued, the term "political participation" can be manifested in alternative
forms in American politics aside from voting such as campaign contributions.
During the primary election, Judy Chu was able to raise the largest amount of
individual campaign contributions. According to official campaign disclosure
forms, the total amount of campaign contributions raised by the Judy Chu
and Diane Martinez campaigns were $226, 108.00 and $196, 559.73,
respectively. Thus, Chu was able to exceed Martinez in individual campaign
contributions by nearly fourteen percent. Moreover, the official campaign
disclosure forms indicated that a majority of Chu's individual contributors
were Asian Pacific professionals, state workers, and small business owners.
The combination of low Asian Pacific precinct voter turnout and large
amounts of campaign contributions is a familiar trend in past local and statewide elections (Tachibana, 1986, p. 536). In contrast to Chu, many of
Martinez's individual contributors were primarily non-Latino individuals, organizations, and companies. 3 This lack of campaign fundraising strength
among the Latino community also represented a familiar trend in past local
and state-wide elections (Saito, 1993, p. 60). One reason which explained
this is that Martinez was the incumbent representative and thus she was
able to tap into mainstream special interest groups ranging from education
to crime fighting. The significance of the Chu campaign's ability to raise
more contributions than the Martinez campaign is that it represented a barrier to the formation of a Latino-Asian political coalition. The low voter turnout
factor had begun to change in areas like San Gabriel Valley with both the
growing Asian Pacific population and number of registered voters. This represented a perceived threat in historically defined Latino districts like the
1994 49th Assembly district which contained cities with large Latino and
Asian Pacific populations. This may explain the sense of political urgency
that underlied both the Martinez and Chu campaigns. Moreover, it may also
explain why Martinez suddenly decided to seek reelection upon Chu's public
announcement. Chu's political recognizability combined with the campaign
fund-raising strength of Asian Pacifies and a growing voter base was seen by
some Latino leaders as a threat to their political status in the 49th Assembly
district.
Trend Two: Racially Polarized Voting Among Latino and Asian Pacific
Precinct Voters In All Randomly Selected Election Precincts

The second and most significant trend found from the election precinct data
for the formation of a viable Latino-Asian Pacific political coalition was that
racially polarized voting theoretically occurred among Latino and Asian Pacific
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voters. In all of the 17 election precincts that were randomly selected and
analyzed, it was theoretically found that the threshold of the Gingles case
(whereby voters of a particular racial group vote 50 percent or greater for a
candidate of the same race) was met and exceeded. Moreover, a Pearson
regression analysis (r) was performed on the precinct data of the two most
populated cities, Alhambra and Monterey Park. The analysis illustrated a
very strong relationship between the total number of identified Latino and
Asian Pacific precinct voters, on one hand, and the total number of votes
received by the Latino and Asian Pacific candidates, on the other hand. With
both of these findings from the precinct data, it will be theoretically argued
that racially polarized voting occurred during the 1994 49th Assembly district
primary election.
The city of Alhambra represented the city with the largest number of election
precincts (51) within the 1994 49th Assembly district. Using the random
selection criteria of every tenth election precinct, five election precincts
(0150014A, 0150028A, 0150044A, 0150063A, and 0150081A) were analyzed. Each of these election precincts contained a large percentage of
Latino and Asian Pacific registered voters.
As illustrated by the open primary results in Table 7, the total number of
identified Latino precinct voters in all five randomly selected election
precincts was 178. The total number of votes that the Latino candidates
Martinez and Torres received was 212. The total number of identified Asian
Pacific precinct voters was 100, and the total number of votes received by
Asian Pacific candidate Judy Chu was 113. The total number of identified
"Other" precinct voters was 318. Therefore, if racially polarized voting theoretically occurred in Alhambra, fifty percent or greater of the total votes that
Martinez and Torres received must have come from the 178 identified Latino
precinct voters in order to meet the Gingles threshold. The same argument
can also be made for Judy Chu in which fifty percent or greater of her votes
must have come from the total 100 identified Asian Pacific precinct voters.
Graph 1 in the Appendix illustrates this argument, in that almost three-quar-

Table 7 Total Number of Identified Latino and Asian
Pacific Election Precinct Voters in Alhambra

Alhambra
Election
Precincts
0150014A
0150028A
0150044A
0150063A
0150081A
Total (T)

Total Number
of ldentifed
Latino
Precinct
Voters
25
18
45
45
45
T=178

Total
Martinez
Precinct
Votes
31
24
37
32
45
T=169

Total
Torres
Precinct
Votes
5
3
12
10
13
T=43

Total Number
of Identified
Asian Pacific Total Chu
Precinct
Precinct
Voters
Votes
15
17
3
3
18
21
27
24
37
48
T=100
T=113

Total Number
of "Other"
Identified
Precinct
Voters
44
109
41
28
96
T=318

Source: Los Angeles County Office of the Registrar Recorder: Office of Campaign Information.
r (Total number of identified Latino precinct voters , Total number of Latino candidate votes) =.87
r 2 =.75
r (Total number of identified A/P precinct voters , Total number of Chu votes)= .96
r2 = .92
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ters of the total Latino identified precinct voters were equivalent to the total
number of votes Martinez received. This trend was also evident with the bar
graphs of the total votes received by Judy Chu and the total identified Asian
Pacific precinct voters. Therefore, the Gingles threshold of 50 percent was
easily met and surpassed by both Latino and Asian Pacific precinct voters.
However, it is important to note that this does not mean that either Martinez,
Torres, or Chu only received votes from their respective racially identified voters, but they must also have come from the other two identified groups of
precinct voters. What it does indicate is that a majority of the Latino and
Asian Pacific votes were racially polarized among their respective racial candidates.
A Pearson regression analysis performed on the total number of identified
Latino precinct voters and the total number of votes received by the Latino
candidates indicated a very strong relationship with a correlation coefficient
(r 2 ) of .75. The relationship between the total number of identified Asian
Pacific precinct voters and the total number of votes Chu received was also
very strong in which a correlation coefficient (r 2 ) of .92. Therefore, as a
result of both findings, it can be argued with some degree of certainty that
racially polarized voting occured among the Latino and Asian Pacific identified voters in Alhambra.
Monterey Park was the city with the second largest number of election
precincts in the 1994 49th Assembly district with a total of 41. Four randomly selected election precincts were analyzed. According to Table 8, the
total number of identified Latino precinct voters was 280. The total number
of votes that both Latino candidates received was 223. The total number of
Asian Pacific identified precinct voters was 88, and the total number of votes
Chu received was 140. The total number of identified "Other" voters was
142. If racially polarized voting were to occur in Monterey Park, as in
Alhambra, a majority of the total identified Latino precinct voters must have
voted for the two Latino candidates. The same must also be true for the
total identified Asian Pacific precinct voters, a majority of whom must have
voted for Chu.
As seen in Graph 2 in the Appendix, over three-quarters of the total votes for
Martinez and Torres were equivalent to the total number of identified Latino
precinct voters. The total number of identified Asian Pacific precinct voters
was equivalent to over three-fifths of the total votes for Chu. Again, as seen
in Alhambra, the Gingles threshold was exceeded by the identified Latino
and Asian Pacific precinct voters.
A Pearson regression analysis performed on the Monterey Park precinct data
indicated a strong relationship between the total number of identified Latino
and Asian Pacific precinct voters with the total number of votes received by
the Latino and Asian Pacific candidates. A correlation coefficient (r 2 ) of .57
was determined for the relationship between identified Latino precinct voters
and the total number of votes received by both Latino candidates. An even
higher correlation coefficient (r 2 ) of .68 was calculated for the relationship
between identified Asian Pacific precinct voters and votes for Chu.
Therefore, like Alhambra, racially polarized voting more than likely occurred
among the Latino and Asian Pacific precinct voters for their respective candidates during the 1994 49th Assembly primary election.
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Table 8 Total Number of Identified Latino and Asian Pacific
Election Precinct Voters in Monterey Park
Monterey
Park
Election
Precincts
4500016A
4500030A
4500046A
4500090A
Total (T)

Total Number
of ldentifed
Latino
Precinct
Voters
39
86
50
105
T;280

Total
Martinez
Precinct
Votes
25
81
21
48
T;175

Total
Torres
Precinct
Votes
7
11
15
15
T;48

Total Number
of Identified
Asian Pacific
Precinct
Voters
19
17
7
45
T;88

Total Chu
Precinct
Votes
25
46
13
56
T;140

Total Number
of "Other"
Identified
Precinct
Voters
40
68
26
8
T ; 142

Source: Los Angeles County Office of the Registrar Recorder: Office of Campaign Information .
r (Total number of identified Latino precinct voters, Total number of Latino candidate votes); .76
r2 ; _57
r (Total number of identified A/ P precinct voters , Total number of Chu votes);.83
r2 ; .68

The significance of finding racially polarized voting in Alhambra and Monterey
Park is that both cities constituted the two largest Latino and Asian Pacific
populations in the 1994 49th Assembly district. In Alhambra, Latinos and
Asian Pacifies represented 36 and 39 percent of the total population respectively. In Monterey Park, Latinos and Asian Pacifies represented 30 and 58
percent of the total population, respectively. The demographic makeup and
voting trends of Latinos and Asian Pacifies in Alhambra and Monterey Park
support the Erie et al. thesis that among highly commingled areas, barriers
to political coalitions arise.
As illustrated by Table 9, in all of the randomly selected election precincts in
the partially incorporated cities of East Los Angeles, Los Angeles, and
Belvedere, there was a high degree of racially polarized voting among the
identified Latino and Asian Pacific precinct voters. In East Los Angeles, the
total number of identified Latino precinct voters was 92 compared with the
81 total votes for Martinez and Torres. This would result in a ratio, as illustrated by Graph 3 in the Appendix, of over three-quarters. In the randomly
selected election precincts in Los Angeles , the total number of identified
Latino precinct voters was 216 compared with the 167 total votes for
Martinez and Torres. The ratio between these two, as illustrated by Graph 4
(p. 36), was over three-quarters. In the one randomly selected election
precinct of Belvedere, the total number of identified Latino election precinct
voters was 106 compared with the 98 total votes for Martinez and Torres for
a ratio of over three- quarters according to Graph 5.
For the identified Asian Pacific precinct voters in these election precincts,
there also existed a high degree of racially polarized voting. In the one election precinct in East Los Angeles, the number of identified Asian Pacific
precinct voters (9) was exactly equivalent to the number of total votes for
Chu as illustrated in Graph 3 (p. 36). In the Los Angeles election precinct,
the total number of identified Asian Pacific voters was 10 compared to the
total 27 votes received by Chu. Based on these findings, a strong probability existed that Chu's total votes came from a majority of the 10 identified
Asian Pacific precinct voters and some from the precinct voters identified as
" Other. " The significance of these findings in the above election precincts
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Table 9 Total Number of Identified Latino and Asian Pacific Election
Precinct Voters in East Los Angeles, Los Angeles, and Belvedere
East Los
Angeles
Election
Precincts

Total Number
of ldentifed
Latino
Precinct
Voters

Total
Martinez
Precinct
Votes

Total
Torres
Precinct
Votes

Total Number
of Identified
Asian Pacific
Precinct
Voters

Total Chu
Precinct
Votes

Total Number
of "Other"
Identified
Precinct
Voters

4500016A
Total (T)

92
T=92

57
T=57

24
T=24

9
T=9

9
T=9

5
T=5

Los
Angeles
Election
Precincts

Total Number
of ldentifed
Latino
Precinct
Voters

Total
Martinez
Precinct
Votes

Total
Torres
Precinct
Votes

Total Number
of Identified
Asian Pacific
Precinct
Voters

Total Chu
Precinct
Votes

Total Number
of "Other"
Identified
Precinct
Voters

9000901A
9002811A
Total /Tl

122
94
T=216

86
57
T=143

12
12
T=24

10
0
T=10

20
7
T=27

16
12
T=28

Belvedere
Election
Precincts

Total Number
of ldentifed
Latino
Precinct
Voters

Total
Martinez
Precinct
Votes

Total
Torres
Precinct
Votes

Total Number
of Identified
Asian Pacific
Precinct
Voters

Total Chu
Precinct
Votes

Total Number
of "Other"
Identified
Precinct
Voters

0850054A
Total (T)

106
T = 106

82
T=82

16
T=16

3
T=3

23
T=23

8
T=B

Source: Los Angeles County Office of the Registrar Recorder: Office of Campaign Information.

was that the Gingles threshold was easily exceeded. Since only one or two
randomly selected election precincts in each of these partially incorporated
cities was chosen, a regression analysis could not be performed.
In some cities, particularly East Los Angeles , the theoretical argument that
racially polarized voting occurs was magnified by the disproportionate number of Latino and Asian Pacific precinct voters. In this heavily Latino populated city, there were 92 identified Latino precinct voters compared to 9 identified Asian Pacific precinct voters . The ratio of identified Latino precinct voters to the total votes for Martinez and Torres was almost one to one. The
ratio of identified Asian Pacific precinct voters to the total votes for Chu was
exactly one to one. Thus, in a city where Latinos represented 96 percent of
the total population compared to less than 2 percent for Asian Pacifies,
based on the above findings, there appeared to be no cross-racial voting by
Latinos for Chu.
According to Table 10, a high degree of racially polarized voting occured in
the randomly selected election precincts in Rosemead and San Gabriel. In
Rosemead, the total number of identified Latino voters was 92 compared
with the 104 total votes for Martinez and Torres. In San Gabriel, the total
number of identified Latino voters was 87 was almost the same as the 88
total votes for Martinez and Chu.
The total number of identified Asian Pacific precinct voters in the Rosemead
election precincts was 42 compared with the 49 total votes Chu received. In
the San Gabriel election precincts, there existed a total number of 22 identified Asian Pacific voters compared with the 38 total votes Chu received. As
seen in Graph 6 and Graph 7, the Gingles test is clearly met in Rosemead
and San Gabriel, and strongly illustrates the case that racially polarized vot1998-99 National Asian Pacific American Political Almanac
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ing occured among Latino and Asian Pacific voters. Therefore, in the next
section, the effects of such voting will be examined on the development and
maintenance of a viable Latino-Asian Pacific political coalition.
Ill. THE EFFECTS OF RACIALLY POLARIZED
VOTING ON LATINO-ASIAN PACIFIC POLITICAL
COALITION BUILDING

As illustrated earlier, the prospects for a Latino-Asian Pacific political coalition in the 1994 49th Assembly district primary election appeared very slim
Table 10 Total Number of Identified Latino and Asian Pacific Election
Precinct Voters in Rosemead and San Gabriel

Rosemead
Election
Precincts

Total Number
of ldentifed
Latino
Precinct
Voters

Total
Martinez
Precinct
Votes

Total
Torres
Precinct
Votes

Total Number
of Identified
Asian Pacific
Precinct
Voters

Total Chu
Precinct
Votes

Total Number
of "Other"
Identified
Precinct
Voters

5750017A
5750071A
Total (T)

60
32
T=92

44
41
T=85

11
8
T=19

19
23
T=42

33
16
T=49

57
49
T=106

San
Gabriel
Election
Precincts

Total Number
of ldentifed
Latino
Precinct
Voters

Total
Martinez
Precinct
Votes

Total
Torres
Precinct
Votes

Total Number
of Identified
Asian Pacific
Precinct
Voters

Total Chu
Precinct
Votes

Total Number
of "Other"
Identified
Precinct
Voters

6100015A
6100033A
Total (T)

50
37
T=87

48
34
T=82

2
4
T=6

19
3
T=22

18
20
T=38

101
118
T=219

Source: Los Angeles County Office of the Registrar Recorder: Office of Campaign Information.

due to the high degree of racially polarized voting. Both Martinez and Chu
were able to capture a large percentage of the Latino and Asian Pacific
votes, respectively, but were unable to cross over to the opposite racial
minority voters. As a result of racially polarized voting, a Latino-Asian Pacific
coalition could not develop due to two important factors: 1) the concept of
minority representation versus non-minority representation; and 2) the political incorporation of Asian Pacifies.
Minority versus Non-Minority Representation

The first factor impeding a bi-racial coalition was the necessity to distinguish
between minority versus non-minority representation. For many racial minority groups, as Browning, Marshall, and Tabb stated (Browning, Marshall, and
Tabb, 1990, p. 5), the key struggle of local politics has centered around
actual representation through their incorporation into a bi-racial coalition. In
the case of African American and Latino communities in California which had
no representatives of the same race in 1960, minority representation has
grown to only twenty-seven African American and three Latino mayors in
cities with populations over 50,000. As a result of the need for minority representation, there has been increased racial representation in state and
local positions among the Latino community, although still not proportional
to their population. The same phenomenon also existed among the Asian
Pacific communities in which Judy Chu attempted to become the first
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Chinese American in the Assembly since March Fong Eu left in 1974. Thus,
there has not been a Chinese American representative in the Assembly for
over twenty years, although Asian Pacifies represented the fastest growing
racial group in California (Ong and Azores, p. 2). As seen earlier with Leland
T. Saito's study of the Latino-Asian Pacific political coalition that developed
in 1990 centering on the redistricting and reapportionment of San Gabriel
Valley, the underlying reason why Latino coalition leaders ultimately agreed
to a joint redistricting plan was that it assured to them minority representation through the reelection of a Latino candidate.
With this idea of minority representation in mind, it is understandable why
racially polarized voting occurred among the Latino and Asian Pacific communities in the 1994 49th Assembly district primary election. The 49th
Assembly district community has traditionally been viewed as a historically
"Latino" represented community. Many of its past representatives have
been Latino, as illustrated by Diane Martinez's victories in 1991 and 1995.
The most important challenge faced by Latinos and by Asian Pacifies in the
1994 49th Assembly district primary election was the urgency of obtaining a
minority representation for themselves. This idea would support the Erie et
al. theory that highly commingled areas would experience competition for limited political resources such as elected representatives.
The Political Incorporation of Asian Pacifies: Its Effects Upon Established
Racial Minority Groups and The Development of Interest Group Strategy

A second factor which may have ultimately contributed to racially polarized
voting is the increased political incorporation of Asian Pacifies. As mentioned earlier, t11ere has not been a Chinese American representative in the
State Assembly for over twenty years, despite the fact Asian Pacifies represent the fastest growing racial group in California. Given the trend of
increasing numbers of Asian Pacifies in an atmosphere where all minority
racial groups strive for greater representation, it can be argued that Latinos
perceived Asian Pacifies as a potential threat to their traditionally Latino represented district. The 1994 49th Assembly district primary election represented one Latino represented district that contained an established Latino
voter base (East Los Angeles, Monterey Park, and Alhambra). However, in
the last twenty years, the cities of Monterey Park, Alhambra, Rosemead, and
San Gabriel have witnessed a large Asian Pacific population growth. As a
result of their increased population growth in these cities, younger generation Asian Pacific individuals are slowly being politically incorporated into
mainstream political institutions. There have been studies illustrating that
older generation Asian Pacifies are more concerned with "homeland politics"
than American politics (Pye, 1984, p. 49). Nonetheless, as a result of their
acculturation into the mainstream political processes and institutions during
the last twenty years, Asian Pacific candidates running for local positions
(e.g. city unified school board districts, city council) and state representative
positions (e.g. secretary of state, state treasurer) are becoming more prevalent in California politics. In 1993, for example, Mike Woo became the first
Asian Pacific Los Angeles mayoral candidate to run in the nation's second
largest city.
With the increased political incorporation of Asian Pacifies particularly in
cities within the 1994 49th Assembly district, Asian Pacifies own a degree of
political clout. However, it must also be noted that sheer numerical repre1998-99 National Asian Pacific American Political Almanac

175

sentation is not enough to ensure political clout:
The ability to mount a large-scale protest depends on the
absolute number of people who can be mobilized to demonstrate.
In contrast, the ability to mount a powerful electoral challenge
depends not on numbers but on the percentage which those numbers constitute of the electorate (Browning, Marshall, and Tabb,
1990, p. 13).
With this point in mind, Los Angeles Asian Pacific community leaders realized the political potential that the San Gabriel Valley Asian Pacific constituency possessed. Los Angeles Latino community members recognized
this potential and agreed to cooperate with Asian Pacifies leaders during the
1990 redistricting and reapportionment process. Such a political coalition
between both racial groups would have been unheard of in either the 1970
or 1980 redistricting and reapportionment processes. Asian Pacifies did not
constitute a significant population in San Gabriel during these periods. As
one Asian Pacific coalition member succinctly put it: "I can say that Asians
are committed to working with Latinos because the political reality is that
Asians need Latinos more than Latinos need Asians because our population
is smaller and we have a low number of registered votes" (Saito, 1993, p.
61). The significance of this illustrates how the increased demographic
growth and political incorporation of Asian Pacifies affected established
racial minority groups' political interests. Due to the rapid population growth
of Asian Pacifies in San Gabriel Valley over the last two decades and their
subsequent political acculturation, Latinos realized the necessity of having to
form a political alliance with Asians during the 1990 redistricting and reapportionment process.
Historically established minorities have turned to special interest strategy as
an effective form of political empowerment. According to Bruce Cain:
Typically party allegiance fosters an ideology that gives logical
coherence to or at least some reasoned connection between various issue positions held by its followers. By comparison, groups
adopting special interest orientation eschew permanent alliances
for temporary partnerships of convenience and tend to prefer
strategies that allow them to 'go it alone' (Cain, 1991, p. 15).
The two main reasons for the adoption of special interest strategy, according
to Cain, are the following: the diversity of interests and opinions within the
minority communities themselves and the absence of strong political parties,
with which minorities can identify (Cain, 1991). This may have been the situation with the Latino-Asian Pacific reapportionment coalition in which diverse
interests within and among the two racial groups may have forced the two to
"go it alone" in the 1994 49th Assembly district primary election. An example of this strategy was the decision of the Martinez and Chu campaigns to
run against each other in the Democratic primary as opposed to attempting
to establish a political alliance like the 1990 Latino-Asian Pacific redistricting
and reapportionment coalition. The competing interests that marked both
the Martinez and Chu campaigns overrode any attempts to bridge common
political interests among them. As will be discussed in the next section, the
future of multi-racial coalitions in Los Angeles will depend on a new leadership that must be able to bridge these competing interests.
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IV.

SUMMARY AND

CONCLUSIONS

In the framework of the Erie et al. theory, it appears that the most serious
barrier to a coalition between Latinos and Asian Pacifies in the 1994 49th
Assembly district primary election may be political, because of their diffuse
and commingled residential patterns. This theory is supported by two factors: first, the high degree of racially polarized voting between the two groups
during the primary election; and second, the urgency that underlied both the
Martinez and Chu campaigns for greater minority representation.
The first factor which illustrated the potential barriers to a Latino-Asian
Pacific political coalition is the trend of racially polarized voting that occurred
in the following cities in the 1994 49th Assembly district: Alhambra,
Monterey Park, East Los Angeles, Los Angeles, Rosemead, San Gabriel, and
Belvedere. However, the degree of racially polarized voting differed among
these cities. In the cities with heavily populated Latino and Asian Pacific
concentrations (Alhambra, Monterey Park, East Los Angeles), racially polarized voting was high. A Pearson regression analysis of the total number of
Latino and Asian Pacific identified precinct voters and the total number of
votes, which the Latino and Asian Pacific candidates in Alhambra and
Monterey Park received, showed a significant relationship. In the one election precinct analyzed in East Los Angeles, the city with the largest Latino
population, a strong degree of racially polarized voting occurred when comparing the total number of identified Latino precinct voters with the total
number of votes received by both Martinez and Torres. In smaller incorporated areas with less Latino and Asian Pacific populations such as Belvedere
and parts of Los Angeles, the degree of racially polarized voting was not as
high among the identified Latino and Asian Pacific precinct voters.
It is important to note the limitations of these findings for racial bloc voting
among the Latino and Asian Pacific identified voters. Since neither campaigns nor local newspapers conducted an exit poll of the 1994 49th
Assembly district primary election, the occurrence of racially polarized voting
could not be directly measured. Instead, a theoretical argument of racially
polarized voting was made based on precinct and census data. Thus, it is
recommended that a survey be developed which would target identified and
randomly selected Latino and Asian Pacific precinct voters, who voted in the
primary election. Such surveys could provide information to explain the reason(s) why they voted for a certain candidate.
Nonetheless, the findings of the election precinct data strongly support the
argument that racially polarized voting occurred among the identified Latino
and Asian Pacific voters. This in turn was one of the barriers that existed
against the formation of a Latino-Asian Pacific political coalition. If Latinos
and Asian Pacific voters did in fact vote along racial lines, what was the possibility of them voting for a consensus candidate backed by a Latino-Asian
Pacific political coalition? For example, if a Latino-Asian Pacific political
coalition was formed that agreed to support Judy Chu as their candidate for
the 1994 49th Assembly district primary election, would the Latino voters in
Alhambra, Monterey Park, and East Los Angeles necessarily have voted for
her? Further, the findings illustrated that racial representation in state and
local elected and appointed positions is a key political issue for Latino and
Asian Pacific communities. This belief is supported by the degree of political
urgency that stemmed from the Chu and Martinez campaigns. Judy Chu stat1998-99 National Asian Pacific American Political Almanac
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ed that both Latinos and Asian Pacifies were underrepresented in local government and thus strived for greater political incorporation. Chu believed
that the respective groups' attempts at greater political representation negatively impacted the potentials for a Latino-Asian Pacific political coalition in
the 49th Assembly district: "In some ways there are going to be problems in
this (San Gabriel Valley) area because these groups make up significant percentages of the population and want greater political representation" (Chu,
interview). However, Chu believed that Latinos were already making some inroads for greater political representation at the local and state government
levels compared with Asian Pacifies: "There already exists a group of Latino
Assembly representatives that are flexing their muscle. Latinos are just
beginning to obtain political incorporation. Asians are still at the infancy
stage in (American) politics, but I see them making significant strides in
terms of voter registration and outreach" (Chu, interview).
Attempts to achieve greater political incorporation into local and state representative positions is problematic particularly when a more recent group
begins to challenge politically a pre-established groups ' representation of a
political district. Historically, the major cities within the 1994 49th
Assembly district boundaries (e.g. Monterey Park, East Los Angeles , and
Alhambra) , have been both Latino and Democratic in its constituency and
representation . With the recent influx of Asian Pacifies primarily after the
Immigration Act of 1965, these cities have witnessed the largest Asian
Pacific population growth in the nation during the last twenty years (Ong and
Azores, 1991, p. 12). Subsequently, Asian Pacifies have begun to run as
candidates as opposed to simply being large campaign contributors to nonAsian Pacific candidates . These trends are consistent with the Erie et al theory that competition for limited political resources in highly commingled residential areas like the 1994 49th Assembly district acts as the most serious
obstacle to the formation of a Latino-Asian Pacific political coalition.
Prospects For Future Latino-Asian Pacific Political Coalitions: The Need
For A New Coalition Leadership To Bridge Competing Interests

Despite these findings of racially polarized voting and competition for minority representation, political coalitions between Latinos and Asian Pacifies
might be possible in future local and state elections, particularly with the
reconfiguration of multi-racial politics. The traditional bi-racial coalition in
Los Angeles between White liberals and African Americans must eventually
be reconfigured to accommodate the growing interests of Latinos and Asian
Pacifies. As a result of these new racial groups, ttiere will be those groups
who will likely align with others who have similar ideologies, interests, and
leadership (Sonenshein , 1993, p. 267). According to Erie et al, the
prospects for a political coalition between Latinos and Asian Pacifies will likely rest with policies dealing with nativity and immigration issues. Along these
lines, Sonenshein believed that the future challenge of managing multi-racial
coalitions in the post-incorporation period of Los Angeles is the development
of a leadership which can bridge competing interests and create new coalitions (1993) . Thus , in the case of the 1994 49th Assembly district primary
election, the competing interests of the Latino and Asian Pacific communities must be guided by the same type of political philosophy fostered by the
Latino and Asian Pacific coalition leaders of the 1990 redistricting and reapportionment coalition in San Gabriel (Saito, 1993, p. 60). Those Asian
Pacific coalition leaders, who were newcomers to the electoral politics
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scene, realized the need to develop an alliance with more experienced and
larger represented Latinos. Latino coalition leaders understood the growing
population and campaign fundraising ability of the Asian Pacific community.
It was this form of leadership in both communities that was able to make the
Latino-Asian Pacific political coalition work, despite the Erie et al belief that
political issues like redistricting and reapportionment would be a barrier to
the formation of such a coalition. As a result of this new coalition leadership, future types of bi-racial coalitions in Los Angeles, whether it be
between Asian Pacifies and Latinos, could be possible.
APPENDIX
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Graph 3
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